Introduction
Management literature is almost unanimous in suggesting to product manufacturers to integrate services into their core product offerings (e.g. Bowen et al., 1991; Gadiesh and Gilbert, 1998; Quinn et al., 1990; Wise and Baumgartner, 1999) . The rationale for such integration is normally put forth along three lines. First, there are economic arguments. Substantial revenue can be generated from an installed base of products with a long life cycle (Knecht et al., 1993; Potts, 1988) ; services, in general, have higher margins than products (Anderson et al., 1997; The Economist, 2000; VDMA, 1998) ; and services provide a more stable source of revenue as they are resistant to the economic cycles that drive investment and equipment purchases (Quinn, 1992) . Second, customers are demanding more services. Pressure to downsize to create morē exible ®rms, narrower de®nitions of core competencies and increasing technological complexity that leads to a higher specialization are some of the driving forces behind the rise of service outsourcing (Lojo, 1997) . Finally, there is the competitive argument. Services, by being less visible and more labor dependent, are much more dif®cult to imitate, thus becoming a sustainable source of competitive advantage (Heskett et al., 1997) .
Despite the pro®t potential that services represent, the list of manufacturing organizations with strong service strategies is not as long as the literature would predict. With very few exceptions (e.g. General Electric, ABB, Otis, Caterpillar, etc.), the manufacturers' transition into services has been relatively slow and cautious (VDMA, 1998) . Why is this so? There are three successive hurdles to overcome in making such a transition. First, ®rms might not believe in the economic potential of the service component for their product. As one of the interviewees from our study suggested, ªIt is dif®cult for an engineer who has designed a multi-million dollar piece of equipment to get excited about a contract worth $10,000 for cleaning it.º Second, although a ®rm might realize the service market potential, it may decide that providing services is beyond the scope of their competencies. For example, Digital Equipment Corp. refused for years to provide services as they saw computer design as their core competency. Finally, a ®rm might realize the service market potential, decide to enter that market, but fail in deploying a successful service strategy (e.g. Ford Motor Co.'s attempt to enter post-sales services was blocked by its network of independent dealerships).
Transitioning from product manufacturer into service provider constitutes a major managerial challenge. Services require organizational principles, structures and processes new to the product manufacturer. Not only are new capabilities, metrics and incentives needed, but also the emphasis of the business model changes from transaction-to relationship-based. Developing this new set of capabilities will necessarily divert ®nancial and managerial resources from manufacturing and new product development, the traditional sources of competitive advantage for the organization.
Given the above considerations, the literature is surprisingly sparse in describing how this integration could be carried out, or in detailing the challenges inherent in the transition. Even at the strategic level, it is not clear what the extent of the service offer should be, or what factors to consider when deciding on a product-service mix. This silence in the literature prompted our research. This article reports the ®ndings from a qualitative ®eld study of 11 capital equipment manufacturers known to have initiated an explicit service strategy to support their products.
Field study ± methodology
When articulating our research, we structured our thinking along a continuum from pure-product to pure-service providers (Chase, 1981) , and thought of manufacturing ®rms moving along that axis as they incorporated more product-related services. At the extreme, we envisioned a service organization for which their products are only a small part of their value proposition (e.g. IBM Global Services). Given the lack of complementarity between manufacturing and service capabilities, and previous research suggesting that manufacturing biases would lead to erosion of service quality (Oliva, 2001;  The transition from products to services Oliva and Sterman, 2001) , we expected the transition along this continuum to be disrupted, and eventually lead to the creation of a new organization with a unique service orientation. Accordingly, we designed our ®eldwork to explore the evolution along this line (see Figure 1) . We focused on the machine manufacturing industry because it represents a mature industry with relatively slow market growth and technological innovation. As a result, the industry has been looking to enhance its pro®tability through services (VDMA, 1998) . Industries with products in earlier stages of the life cycle (computers, semiconductors) still rely on product and process innovations to sustain growth and increase pro®tability. On the other hand, industries well known for their service offerings (elevators, medical equipment, aircraft engines) were thought to have a unique advantage ± services are normally provided in the context of strict regulations ± and to be too far along the implementation process.
To explore ®rms' transitions, we employed an inter-disciplinary research approach that included interviews, and a detailed archival assessment of the organizations' experience in integrating services into their product offering (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1984) . We then developed our process theory and frameworks from these observations (Mohr, 1982; Strauss and Corbin, 1990) . Consistent with grounded theory development and our goal to develop a theoretical model of the transformation patterns followed by ®rms that had attempted the transition, our sampling was discriminate. Firms were selected according to their perceived position along the product-service continuum, and were contacted through the Research Institute for Operations Management (FIR) at Aachen University. We sampled until we reached theoretical saturation for the transformation process, i.e. until a recurring pattern for the transformation emerged from our interviews (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) . Our sample included 11 German capital equipment manufacturers with average revenues (2000) of DM3,650 million, and average employment of 10,450. In each organization, we spoke with the head of the service division and, in most cases, with the chief executive of®cer (CEO) or managing director of the organization; all interviews were done in August 2000. Each interview was conducted according to a semi-structured interview protocol based on the framework presented in Figure 1 , and lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. However, given the nature of the research, the interviewees were not required to stay within the standard questions. Several participants were contacted subsequently to elaborate on issues raised or to clarify comments. We supplemented the interviews with information publicly available about the ®rms' performance, operations and service offering.
Servicing the installed base
In describing the service elements provided by manufacturing ®rms, several labels are used in the literature: industrial services, service strategy in manufacturing, product-related services, product-services, or after-sales services. A common theme in this literature is the motivation of ªshowing how services can complement the sale or lease of a tangible good, and their importance for the growth and competitive success of a manufacturing companyº (Mathe and Shapiro, 1993, p. 33) . This motivation, which is rooted in the past neglect of services in manufacturing ®rms, can be characterized as ªbetter services to sell more products.º Although we acknowledge the importance of the product/service interface in the sales function, our ®eldwork yielded a different focus on services provided by manufacturing ®rms, which also resonates in the most recent literature (Patton and Bleuel, 2000; Wise and Baumgartner, 1999) : managing the services relating to a product's installed base.
Durable manufactured products (capital equipment and consumer durable goods) when originally purchased are put to use for their useful life. Such products require services as they advance through their life cycle (acquisition, installation, operation, upgrades, decommission, etc.) , and have associated a cost of ownership beyond the purchase price (spare parts, consumables, maintenance, etc.). A product's installed base (IB) is the total number of products currently under use; IB services is the range of product-or processrelated services required by an end-user over the useful life of a product in order to run it effectively in the context of its operating process. While not denying that manufacturers of consumable goods may bene®t from explicit service strategies, we believe that IB services are large enough to warrant special consideration ± durable products represented 60 per cent of the US industrial production in 2001 (Federal Reserve, 2002) . Focusing on the unique attributes of IB services enables a new framing of the service market opportunity, what is required to compete in it, and the challenges for
The transition from products to services manufacturers to enter that market. We brie¯y discuss each of these points below. First, when de®ning services in relation to a product's IB, some of the de®nitions found in the literature on product-related services may be relaxed:
. Services are not restricted to services bundled with the product: IB services encompass all services required by the end-user to obtain a desired functionality, i.e. use the product in the context of its operating process.
. Service suppliers are not restricted to product manufacturers: components manufacturers, system integrators, end-users' maintenance units and third parties (other manufacturers or independent service providers) also compete in the IB market.
. End-users are not restricted to be industrial ®rms: this distinction is important when focusing on the role of services for customer relations.
The IB framing leads to a more competitive market with greater size and scope. Nevertheless, by integrating the value chain from product design to service provider, product manufacturers have unique advantages when serving their IB:
. Lower customer acquisition costs: since manufacturers are involved in the sales of new products, they have information on new equipment joining the IB.
. Lower knowledge acquisition cost: many of the services provided to an IB require special knowledge about the product and its technology. The product manufacturer has an additional advantage as it has knowledge of the product service requirements over its life cycle.
. Lower capital requirements: manufacturers possess many of the specialized production technologies required to fabricate spare parts or to upgrade existing equipment.
Finally, in terms of challenges, the manufacturer attempting to enter the IB service market faces the dif®culty of managing two tightly-coupled markets. On one hand, increasing service quality and scope might extend the product's useful life, thus reducing its replacement sales. On the other hand, increasing the quality and durability of products might reduce future service revenues. These challenges add to the normal dif®culties of creating a service network to support a geographically distributed IB (see below).
From product manufacturer to service provider
This section summarizes our ®ndings on how organizations in our sample incorporated services into their offering. Our analysis of the actions taken by the ®rms found a recurring pattern on the adoption of IB services. The observed commonalities were not in the speci®c service provided, but in the IJSIM 14,2 nature of the service contracts and in their adoption sequence. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that the transition occurs in stages, and from these we developed a process theory for the transition (see Figure 2) . During each stage, the ®rm focuses on a set of issues and addresses them through the development of new capabilities. Space considerations do not permit us to illustrate each stage; instead, we will focus on the conditions triggering the move, the rationale for the implemented changes and their sequence.
Consolidating the product-related service offering
Most manufacturing ®rms provide services to sell and support their product; in a way, they already are in the market of product-related services. Those services, however, have traditionally grown in different parts of the organization, are fragmented and considered an unpro®table necessity to sell the product. The ®rst step taken by the ®rms in our sample that were successful in developing a service offering, was to consolidate the ®rm's The transition from products to services existing service offering under a single organizational unit. The consolidation process is normally driven by a desire to sell more products and its goal is to improve the service performance. It is typical for organizations to ®nd that services are an important component of the consumer satisfaction indicators, and to consider this integration the ®rst step to improve the delivery of those services.
The consolidation of the service offering is normally accompanied by a strong initiative to improve the ef®ciency, quality and delivery time of the services provided, and the creation of additional services to supplement the service offering. The consolidation of services also comes with the development of a monitoring system to assess the effectiveness and ef®ciency of the service delivery. This monitoring system allows managers, for the ®rst time, to realize the size of the service market and account for services' contribution to the ®rm's operations.
Internally, these changes create the ªtransparency of numbersº needed to get a clear sense of direction and to monitor the success or failure of executed changes. Externally, the improvement of quality of existing services establishes a reputation among clients as a reliable service provider.
Entering the IB service market
Entering the IB services market implies identifying a pro®t opportunity within the service arena and setting up the structures and processes to exploit it. The realization of the pro®t potential often comes via the monitoring mechanism implemented in the previous stage, or after seeing a competitor work with high margins in the service market. Although the triggers for organizations to decide to go into this market differ (change in top management, successful competitor or customer satisfaction survey), the process followed by organizations in this stage is predictable.
There are two major challenges in performing this transition into the IB services. The ®rst dif®culty reported in performing this transition is the required cultural change for a product-centered organization to become serviceoriented. It is dif®cult for an organization built to design and deliver complex equipment to ªget excitedº about the possibility of repairing it. The economics of the service business are different from the economics of the product market, making it dif®cult for the sales organization to focus on small service offerings. Furthermore, in manufacturing ®rms, services are often thought of as add-ons, and initial services (installation, commissioning, etc.) are frequently ªgiven awayº during the negotiations to sell the product. At the core of this cultural transformation, then, the manufacturing ®rm must learn to value services and how to sell, deliver and bill them.
We found that a critical success factor for this transition is the creation of a separate organization to handle the service offering. In our sample, these newly created units had a dedicated sales force (different from the new equipment IJSIM 14,2 sales force), their own service technicians, and an information system to monitor the business operations and to achieve accounting transparency for the new business. It is with this information system that the case is often made to the rest of the organization on how important services are for the overall pro®tability of the ®rm. In our sample, the most successful ®rms in extracting value from the IB services were those that ran this service organization as a pro®t center (or a separate business unit) with pro®t-and-loss responsibility. Our interpretation is that the new organization effectively protects the emerging service culture ± with its metrics, control systems and incentives ± from the values and incentives predominant in the manufacturing organization.
The second major dif®culty reported at this stage is the need to create a global service infrastructure that is capable of responding locally to the requirements of the IB. This presents multiple dif®culties. First, there is the investment decision to build an infrastructure that, in all likelihood, will not generate revenues immediately, and is likely to dilute some of the operating ratios that investors monitor. Second, at the operational level, two new capabilities have to be developed to run a distributed service network effectively: the capability to diffuse knowledge across the network (certi®cation of service centers, etc.) and the ability to manage large organizations of service personnel. Third, the network has to make an explicit decision about the degree of standardization of the service offer in order to balance between the transferability of services across markets vs customization for individual end-users.
Early in this stage, the ®rm traditionally takes services that it currently offers and puts them under pro®t-and-loss accountability. Once the case for the service unit has been made, service organizations tend to start expanding their IB service market either by expanding the service offering to other productcentered services, or by acquiring additional IB, that is, becoming the service provider for third party equipment.
Internally, the focus in this phase is to build a well-functioning service organization, and to develop the metrics needed by a service organization to measure customer satisfaction, employee satisfaction, and business success. Firms use this stage to ®ne-tune the organization further and to expand the business, thereby creating credibility inside the organization. Externally, the organization is establishing itself in the market as an active player with a reputation for actively seeking out opportunities and delivering on promises made. Most companies ®rst establish themselves ®rmly in the basic IB service business before moving to the next stage.
Expanding the IB service offering
The expansion of the service offering takes place once the core functionality of the service organization has been set, and it occurs through two distinct transformations. The ®rst transition is to change the focus of customer The transition from products to services interactions from transaction-to relationship-based. Moving along this dimension (vertical axis of Table I ) changes the way the service is priced: from a markup for labor and parts every time a service is provided, to a ®xed price covering all services over an agreed period. The effect of this form of contracting is that the service provider assumes the risk of equipment failure. Relationship-based services centered around the product normally take the form of maintenance contracts priced in terms of operational availability and response time in case of failure. The move towards maintenance contracts is often triggered by a desire to make better use of the installed service organization. For the service provider, once the service organization is in place, it becomes a ®xed cost and the main driver of pro®tability is capacity utilization. Established service contracts reduce the variability and unpredictability of the demand over the installed capacity, and allow a higher average capacity utilization. While the capacity utilization argument explains why a service provider should look into offering service contracts, there is no compelling argument on why end-users should outsource the maintenance function. In order to make the offer ªtangibleº to the end-user, the pricing of these services has to be done on the basis of equipment availability, and not based on the provider's cost of monitoring the equipment, and performing scheduled maintenance and emergency repairs. Although an impressive technological feat, many organizations have struggled to sell their condition monitoring capabilities (remote monitoring) for their products. The problem is that the condition monitoring capability per se does not add value to the end-user. It is only when that capability is transferred into an offer of higher equipment availability, and priced accordingly, that the end-user has the ability to quantify the value of the offering.
Pricing equipment availability requires the service provider to assume the equipment's operating risk, i.e. pricing will be based either on the opportunity cost of machine failure, or the traditional maintenance cost for the end-user's maintenance organization. Pro®tability under this pricing mechanism depends on how accurate the organization is in assessing the failure risks for the equipment. This requires a new set of skills within the service organization and information gathering capabilities to determine risk better. Although most organizations do not have the historical data to predict failure rates, we saw organizations willing to develop the risk assessment skills through experience ± i.e. they were willing to take unpro®table maintenance contracts to start developing those skills. In terms of providing a cost advantage, it is normally possible for the service provider to pass on the bene®ts of higher utilization of the established service capacity as a lower price for the maintenance of the equipment. However, the main advantage that manufacturers have over other maintenance organizations is their cumulative experience in maintaining their own equipment, and the use of their product development and systems integration expertise to develop and deliver better maintenance practices. Externally, this step requires marketing efforts and time, as the ®rm needs to establish an ongoing relationship with the end-user.
The second transition changes the focus of the value proposition to the end-user from product ef®cacy ± whether the product works ± to the product's ef®ciency and effectiveness within the end-user's process. As the service provider moves along this dimension (horizontal axis of Table I ), the product becomes part of the offering as opposed to being the center of the value proposition. Although many manufacturers provide technical or professional services as part of a pre-sale effort, centering the offering on the end-user's process is equivalent to shifting the emphasis of the business from machine manufacturer to ªsolution providerº and developing services to support and improve continuously the utilization and effectiveness of the installed base. The big step required in this stage is to provide these services for an installed base over its complete life cycle as opposed to services required for the installation and commissioning of new product.
Establishing process-centered services presents two important challenges. First, the ®rm needs to replicate, for a professional service infrastructure, the HR and knowledge management capabilities developed for the service network. The second challenge is a marketing challenge. The service organization needs to develop new networks to work with a new distribution channel and a different set of contacts within the end-user organization. The structures needed to succeed in this space may resemble those of professional service ®rms.
The transition from products to services
The service offerings beyond transaction-based and product-oriented services require the development of signi®cant capabilities. The two directions suggested above ± towards relationship contracts or towards process oriented services ± seem to represent orthogonal developments with few infrastructure and capabilities synergies. Although maintenance services seem to leverage better the infrastructure developed for the basic services, our ®eldwork provided no evidence to suggest advantages of entering one of these spaces before the other. However, given the signi®cant challenges that a simultaneous entry into both ®elds represents, it may be advisable to tackle them sequentially.
Taking over the end-user's operations
Advancing in the two dimensions yields the ªpure service organizationº ± one that assumes operating risk and takes entire responsibility of the end-user's process (see Table I for examples). The move into the ®eld of operational services, which includes taking over an end-user's maintenance or operating organization, is a largely uncharted territory for manufacturers in most industries, and no organization in our sample had yet moved into this space. From a capability perspective, a ®rm should take this step only after its service organization has established itself ®rmly in the maintenance and professional services market. Given their current state as early stage service providers, this is a transition that most manufacturing ®rms probably will not initiate soon.
Implications for research and practice
In terms of future research, we believe that there are unaddressed issues associated with the hurdles identi®ed for manufacturers to move into services ± namely: the evaluation of the IB service potential, and the extent to which a ®rm should enter the service market. Decision support models to quantify the IB potential, and to aid in deciding if ± and when in the product life cycle ± a ®rm should enter the IB market, seem like a promising research avenue. Just as product and market attributes determine the pro®tability potential from the IB, we believe that organizational attributes dictate the extent to which a ®rm should move along the product-service continuum.
At the implementation level, the third hurdle, most challenges seem to be in the organizational change domain ± goals, incentives, change management, etc. The framework developed here, by identifying the developmental capability requirements of each stage and viable organizational solutions for integrated service providers, provides the ®rst step in determining the goals for the transition. In this context, our ®ndings have direct managerial implications.
First, while the stages described above do not always happen in distinct sequence, in all successful organizations there was a deliberate, systematic and well-structured transformation effort. Our data suggest that there is a particular order in which ®rms need to tackle challenges and develop capabilities; ®rms attempting to sell advanced services ± e.g. maintenance or professional ± without having developed the capabilities and pro®ciency in basic product-oriented services was a failure mode that we observed several times. The framework presented above suggests a developmental approach-based on capabilities ± to the challenge of becoming a service provider. By identifying the required skill set for the next stage, the framework allows management to concentrate on a plan to develop or acquire it. Second, while it is possible for a ®rm to provide product-related services within the context of a manufacturing operation, we found that ®rms that were fully exploiting the market opportunity for IB services had isolated their service operations and personnel from the manufacturing and product placement operations. Although we had expected this separation of activities in the most advanced service providers, we expected organizations in the early stages of developing service offerings to be leveraging the manufacturers' advantages in IB services (see the section entitled ªServicing the installed baseº), and were surprised by how early in the transition process ®rms created a separate service organization. It is not clear from our data, however, if the success of the isolated service organizations was due to the additional managerial focus these organizations received, or if, as we expected, cultural and managerial biases are responsible for thwarting the service development efforts in product-centric cultures.
Finally, the early separation of service and manufacturing operations raises the question of how organizations can leverage the advantages of the manufacturing ®rm when moving towards operational services. Manufacturers' advantages seem to diminish fast beyond basic services, suggesting intermediate stopping points in the transition spectrum, or much higher investment to provide advanced services. We saw little evidence of vertically integrated models to provide services in our sample. Instead, manufacturing ®rms may have to adopt horizontal service delivery structures when moving into operational services. In these structures, a service integrator would be orchestrating the delivery of operational services by a network of service players including manufacturers, maintenance and logistics specialists and professional service ®rms.
Our sample was small, bounded to one industry, and, perhaps due to the industry focus, limited to ®rms in the early stages of the transition into services. Further research is necessary to assess the experience and challenges of companies further into the transition process. Development of these ideas could prove especially useful to ®rms facing the challenges of product commoditization ± e.g. computers, electronics, autos ± and that are looking into services as a way to differentiate their offering, satisfy their customers and improve their ®nancial performance.
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